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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The question presented by this appeal is whether a 
Pennsylvania public school district violates the Constitution 
when it sets teacher salaries based, in part, on prior in-state 
teaching experience.  We hold it does not. 
I 
  In September 2006, the Steel Valley School District 
hired Patrick Connelly as a sixth grade teacher.  Steel Valley 
pays its teachers pursuant to a salary scale based on their 
education and years of experience.  At the time he was hired, 
Connelly had nine years of teaching experience—all in 
Maryland.  Because Connelly acquired his teaching 
experience outside Pennsylvania, however, Steel Valley 
credited him with only one year.  Other new teachers with 
like experience acquired within Pennsylvania (but not at Steel 
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Valley) received at least partial credit for each year they had 
taught. 
 Because Steel Valley gave Connelly only one year of 
credit, his initial annual salary was $38,023, which was 
substantially less than the $49,476 Connelly alleged he would 
have received had Steel Valley given him full credit for his 
experience.  As time passed, Connelly‘s initial salary 
determination continued to adversely affect his pay.  During 
the 2010–11 academic year, Connelly‘s salary was 
approximately $22,000 less than it would have been had he 
received full credit in 2006. 
 In June 2011, Connelly filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
asserting two Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  Specifically, Connelly argued that Steel 
Valley‘s failure to fully credit his out-of-state teaching 
experience violated his right to interstate travel under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and denied him equal 
protection of the law.  The District Court granted Steel 
Valley‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that Connelly ―does 
not state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because 
the classification alleged is based on location of teaching 
experience, not residency.‖  Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. 
Dist., No. 11-851, 2011 WL 5024415, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 
20, 2011).  The Court dismissed Connelly‘s complaint with 
prejudice, holding that any amendment would be futile.  Id. at 
*8.  This appeal followed. 
 
II 
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 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion 
to dismiss.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 
(3d Cir. 2009).  To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff 
must provide ―more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 
not do.‖  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007) (citation omitted).  The plaintiff must allege ―enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‖  Id. 
at 570.  This standard requires the plaintiff to show ―more 
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.‖  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
 Twombly and Iqbal require us to take the following 
three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:  
First, the court must take note of the elements a 
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.  Second, 
the court should identify allegations that, 
because they are no more than conclusions, are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, 
where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 
a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement for relief. 
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 
130 (3d Cir. 2010)) (alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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III 
 Connelly claims Steel Valley‘s salary scale impaired 
his right to travel interstate in violation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV (as incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment) and the Equal Protection Clause.  
We review both of Connelly‘s claims under the same standard 
because ―the right to interstate travel finds its ‗most forceful 
expression in the context of equal protection analysis.‘‖  
Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan, 
J., concurring)). 
A 
 We begin by considering which equal protection 
standard governs our review of Steel Valley‘s pay scale.  The 
parties vigorously dispute this point because the standard of 
review (i.e., rational basis review or strict scrutiny) is often 
outcome determinative.  See Laurence H. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law §16-30, at 1089 (1st ed. 1978) (noting 
strict scrutiny is a ―virtual death-blow‖); Laurence H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law §16-2, at 1442–43 (2d ed. 
1988) (―The traditional deference both to legislative purpose 
and to legislative selections among means continues . . . to 
make the rationality requirement largely equivalent to a 
strong presumption of constitutionality.‖).  As Connelly 
correctly notes, Steel Valley set his salary based on a 
classification that paid those with in-state teaching experience 
more than those with out-of-state experience.  He argues that 
because this classification ―serves to penalize the exercise of 
his right to migrate,‖ it should be subject to strict scrutiny.  
Steel Valley counters that rational basis review applies. 
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 The state‘s creation of a classification is not ―per se 
unconstitutional or automatically subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny.‖  Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 
184 (3d Cir. 1998).  If a ―classification ‗neither burdens a 
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold 
it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate 
end.‘‖  Id. (quoting Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997)) 
(alteration omitted).  However, ―a classification that trammels 
fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently 
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage . . . 
must meet the strict scrutiny standard, under which a law 
must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government 
interest.‖  Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1266 (citation, alteration, 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Connelly does not argue that Steel Valley‘s 
classification affects a suspect class, so strict scrutiny will 
apply only if it burdens a fundamental right.  The right to 
interstate travel has been recognized as fundamental by the 
Supreme Court.  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630, 
638 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  The Court has also noted that 
the right to travel has at least three components: (1) ―the right 
of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State‖; 
(2) ―the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an 
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second 
State‖; and (3) ―for those travelers who elect to become 
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens 
of that State.‖  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).  The 
parties agree that Connelly‘s claim implicates only the third 
Saenz component.  Therefore, we must determine whether 
Steel Valley‘s experience-based classification penalized 
Connelly‘s fundamental right to be treated like other 
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Pennsylvania citizens.  See Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 
476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986) (―A state law implicates the right 
travel when . . . it uses ‗any classification which serves to 
penalize the exercise of that right.‘‖ (quoting Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972))). 
 In this regard, we have recognized that strict scrutiny 
applies only when the state creates ―‗distinctions between 
newcomers and longer term residents.‘‖  Schumacher, 965 
F.2d at 1267 (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6); see also 
Maldonado, 157 F.3d at 181–82, 190 (finding Pennsylvania 
law limiting amount of welfare benefits a family could 
receive during its first twelve months in the state triggered 
strict scrutiny).  In other words, strict scrutiny applies when 
the state conditions the receipt of certain government benefits 
on the duration of the recipient‘s residence in the state.  See 
Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1267 (analyzing the history of the 
Supreme Court‘s treatment of residency-based distinctions).  
As the District Court correctly noted, in a line of cases 
implicating the fundamental right to travel from Shapiro v. 
Thompson, to Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court has applied 
strict scrutiny only to durational residency requirements.  See 
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492–93, 504 (state law limiting Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families funds for new residents); 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 252, 261–62 
(1974) (state law requiring indigents to have resided in county 
for previous twelve months before receiving non-emergency 
medical care); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 334–35 (one-year waiting 
period to vote); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (one-year waiting 
period to receive welfare benefits). 
 When the receipt of a government benefit is 
conditioned on factors other than duration of residency, we 
apply rational basis review to determine whether the right to 
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travel has been unconstitutionally burdened.  In Schumacher, 
we considered a Pennsylvania bar admission rule that 
prevented graduates of unaccredited law schools from sitting 
for the Pennsylvania bar exam unless: they were members of 
the bar of a state with a reciprocal bar admission policy, were 
in good standing with that bar, and had practiced law in the 
state for more than five years.  965 F.2d at 1264, 1268.  We 
applied the rational basis standard because the Pennsylvania 
bar rule ―neither condition[ed] the receipt of in-state benefits 
on residency nor classifie[d] applicants on the basis of 
residency.‖  Id. at 1267.  We noted that the bar rule was 
unlike the classifications at issue in the Shapiro line of cases 
which, ―without exception, involved challenges to state laws 
that create distinctions between newcomers and longer term 
residents.‖  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 As the District Court correctly noted, Steel Valley‘s 
classification is based on the location of teaching experience, 
not duration of residency.  Thus, Connelly is being treated no 
differently than lifelong residents of Pennsylvania.  He does 
not allege that residents of Pennsylvania who taught out of 
state for nine years prior to working at Steel Valley are given 
more credit than was he for their comparable out-of-state 
teaching experience.  Nor does Connelly sufficiently rebut 
Steel Valley‘s argument that a teacher who resides in 
Pennsylvania but teaches in a neighboring state would be 
subject to the same classification as Connelly, should that 
teacher later decide to seek employment with Steel Valley. 
 A simple example illustrates the problem with 
Connelly‘s argument.  Consider a teacher who, for his whole 
life, has lived in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, but spent the first 
decade of his teaching career working at a public school in 
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Frederick, Maryland.  If that teacher were to leave the 
Frederick school and take a position with Steel Valley, he 
presumably would receive the same credit for his Maryland 
teaching experience that Connelly received.  Thus, only the 
teacher‘s lack of Pennsylvania teaching experience—not his 
residency—would adversely affect his starting pay.  For that 
reason, Steel Valley‘s classification creates no substantial 
burden on the right to travel. 
 This is not to deny that Steel Valley‘s classification 
creates some incidental burden on interstate travel.  Teachers 
who reside outside of Pennsylvania and who have years of 
teaching experience in their home states may elect not to 
move to Pennsylvania because they might not receive full 
credit for their teaching experience.  As we noted in 
Schumacher, however, a mere ―impediment to plaintiffs‘ 
freedom of movement‖ which has ―some deterrent effect on 
nonresident[s] . . . who wish to migrate to Pennsylvania‖ is 
not enough to give rise to strict scrutiny.  965 F.2d at 1267; 
see also id. (―[T]he Constitution does not guarantee that 
citizens of State A may move to State B and enjoy the same 
privileges they did as citizens of State A, only that citizens of 
State A may move to State B and be treated on similar terms 
as the citizens of State B.‖).  Because Steel Valley‘s salary 
classification treats citizens differently based only on their 
teaching experience irrespective of their residency, strict 
scrutiny does not apply.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Connelly also argues that strict scrutiny applies 
because he has a fundamental right not to be subject to a 
classification that discriminates between teaching experience 
in Maryland versus Pennsylvania.  This is an incorrect 
statement of the law.  In Saenz, the Court explained that the 
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 Finally, Connelly urges us to follow Erisman v. 
Chartiers Valley School District, Civ. No. 00-1102 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 17, 2001), which supports his argument that we should 
apply strict scrutiny to Steel Valley‘s experience-based salary 
classification.  The facts of Erisman and this case are 
remarkably similar.  There, a teacher with twenty-two years 
of experience in Maryland was hired by a Pennsylvania 
school district that denied her nine steps of salary scale credit.  
Erisman, slip op. at 1.  The magistrate judge reasoned that the 
classification was subject to strict scrutiny because ―[t]he 
policy would clearly cause greater injury to those who reside 
out of state and who intend to make Pennsylvania their new 
place of residence.‖  Id. at 8.  Therefore, he found that ―the 
practical effect of the district‘s policy is to impose a 
substantial burden on interstate migration.‖  Id.  We decline 
Connelly‘s invitation to follow Erisman because we are 
convinced that it was wrongly decided. 
 The relevant distinction when evaluating a claim 
asserting a violation of the fundamental right to travel is 
between long-term and short-term residents, not current 
residents and prospective residents.  See Schumacher, 965 
F.2d at 1267.  Indeed, the court in Erisman recognized that 
new Pennsylvania residents were treated the same as longer 
term residents under the school‘s policy.  See Erisman, slip 
                                                                                                             
―right to travel embraces the citizen‘s right to be treated 
equally in her new State of residence.‖  526 U.S. at 505.  The 
Supreme Court has never found that a classification based 
solely on the location of work experience is sufficient to 
trigger strict scrutiny without a showing of disparate 
treatment between new and old residents. 
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op. at 8–9 (noting that longer term Pennsylvania teachers‘ 
right to interstate travel ―is just as surely impaired by this 
policy as is the citizen of another State selecting to come to 
Pennsylvania for the first time‖).  The right to travel simply is 
not implicated when there is no discrimination based on the 
duration of one‘s residency.2 
 In sum, because Connelly‘s allegations cannot support 
an inference that Steel Valley penalized him for exercising his 
right to interstate travel, its salary classification does not 
implicate a fundamental right.  See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 
903.  Therefore, Steel Valley‘s decision to provide Connelly 
with less than full credit for out-of-state teaching experience 
is subject to rational basis review. 
B 
                                                 
2
 Connelly also relies on Hammond v. Illinois State 
Board of Education, 624 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Ill. 1986).  
Hammond is inapplicable here because the court limited its 
analysis of an in-state teaching requirement for school 
superintendent candidates to whether the policy was 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest and avoided a 
discussion of the plaintiff‘s right to travel argument.  See id. 
at 1155.  Moreover, the court indicated in dicta that the 
teaching requirement did not implicate the plaintiff‘s right to 
travel because it ―treats both Illinois and non-Illinois residents 
equal; both must have prior Illinois teaching experience.‖  Id.  
Thus, Hammond actually supports our holding that an 
experience-based classification that treats both new and old 
residents equally does not run afoul of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. 
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 As we shall explain, Steel Valley‘s experience-based 
salary classification is sufficiently tied to the legitimate state 
purpose of promoting an efficient and effective public school 
system to pass the rational basis test.  Accordingly, we hold 
that Steel Valley did not violate Connelly‘s right to travel. 
 ―State laws that neither employ a suspect classification 
nor impinge a fundamental right are ‗entitled to a 
presumption of validity against attack under the Equal 
Protection Clause.‘‖  Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1269 (quoting 
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979)).  ―[W]e will 
uphold the [law] so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end.‖  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).  
In our evaluation of whether a state action is rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest, we are ―free to consider any 
conceivable . . . purpose‖ and ―are not limited to considering 
only the goal stated by the‖ state actor.  Ramsgate Ct. 
Townhome Ass’n v. West Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157, 160 
(3d Cir. 2002) (applying rational basis review to a waste 
removal ordinance). 
 The District Court cited two justifications for offering 
greater compensation to those with in-state teaching 
experience: valuing familiarity with the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education‘s (DOE) policies, procedures, and 
regulations; and promoting efficiency in the education 
system.  Connelly, 2011 WL 5024415, at *7.  The DOE has 
established ―rigorous academic standards and assessments to 
facilitate the improvement of student achievement and to 
provide parents and communities a measure by which school 
performance can be determined.‖  22 Pa. Code § 4.2.  The 
DOE‘s academic and assessment standards set forth 
guidelines for teachers in areas including: curriculum and 
instruction tailored to different grade levels and subjects; 
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grading and scheduling; standardized testing; and special 
education.  See id. § 4.1 et seq. 
 It is reasonable to assume that teachers who have more 
experience working within Pennsylvania schools have greater 
familiarity with these regulations and the goals they are 
expected to accomplish.  Beyond familiarity with the 
regulations, it is also reasonable to assume that teachers with 
more experience working within the system would have a 
better grasp on what methods are most successful in 
achieving the goals the DOE has established.  Therefore, a 
school district may rationally place a premium on teachers 
who have more experience working within the Pennsylvania 
school system in order to achieve the legitimate goal of an 
efficient and effective public education system. 
 Given the deferential standard we employ when 
considering a state policy under rational basis review, see 
Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1269, these reasons suffice to 
uphold Steel Valley‘s policy.  Therefore, the District Court 
did not err when it dismissed Connelly‘s complaint. 
IV 
 Finally, Connelly argues that the District Court erred 
when it dismissed his complaint with prejudice without 
giving him the opportunity to amend.  ―We review a district 
court decision refusing leave to amend . . . for abuse of 
discretion.‖  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 
2008)).  ―It does not matter whether or not a plaintiff seeks 
leave to amend.  We have instructed that if a complaint is 
vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a 
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curative amendment, unless an amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.‖  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 Here, the District Court dismissed Connelly‘s 
complaint with prejudice because it determined that any 
amendment would be futile.  Connelly, 2011 WL 5024415, at 
*8.  We cannot say this was an abuse of discretion.  The facts 
of this case are undisputed.  Steel Valley does not challenge 
Connelly‘s assertion that his initial salary would have been 
higher had his teaching experience been in Pennsylvania 
instead of Maryland.  And Connelly concedes (as he must) 
that this salary classification was based on location of 
teaching experience rather than state of residence.  Finally, 
though the record is sparse, there is no evidence that 
Connelly‘s claim failed due to a lack of factual specificity.  
See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (if a 
complaint is dismissed ―for lack of factual specificity, 
[plaintiff] should be given a reasonable opportunity to cure 
the defect, if he can, by amendment of the complaint‖ 
(quoting Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Connelly leave to amend his complaint. 
 
V 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court‘s order granting Steel Valley‘s motion to dismiss. 
